Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid by Pozen, David E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2006 
Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid 
David E. Pozen 
Columbia Law School, dpozen@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David E. Pozen, Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid, YALE LAW JOURNAL, VOL. 116, P. 869, 2007 (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2457 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=951236Electronic copy of this p per is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=951236









Tax Expenditures as Foreign Aid 
Few issues in global politics are as contentious as foreign aid—how much 
rich countries should give, in what ways, to whom. For years, it has been a 
commonplace that U.S. policies are stingy. The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) routinely ranks the United States far 
behind its industrialized peers in official development assistance (ODA), 
measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI).1 An endless parade 
of critics has implored the government to do more; some suggest that the Bush 
Administration’s support for the Monterrey Consensus, which sets a goal of 
increasing assistance to 0.7% of GNI, commits it to do more.2 Against these 
allegations of miserliness, executive officials and certain sympathetic scholars 
have begun to argue that the published statistics are misleading because they 
fail to account for individual and corporate philanthropy. What the OECD 
misses, this argument runs, is the exceptional extent of Americans’ private 
generosity.3 
 
1.  See, e.g., RICHARD MANNING, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., DEVELOPMENT CO-
OPERATION REPORT 2005, at 16 tbl.1.1 (2006) (ranking the United States second to last in 
2004 and last in 2006, with an ODA/GNI ratio less than half the European Union average). 
In 2004 the United States gave $19.7 billion, or 0.17% of GNI. Id. 
2.  See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 
329, 337-40 (2005) (asserting that questions about solving global poverty are “particularly 
American questions these days” and urging the U.S. government to fulfill its Monterrey 
Consensus pledge); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2005, at 86 (2005) (describing the Monterrey Consensus and the United States’ explicit 
refusal to “see the 0.7% target as an operational budget commitment”). 
3.  Perhaps the most influential work in this vein has been that of Carol Adelman and her 
colleagues at the Hudson Institute. See, e.g., CAROL C. ADELMAN ET AL., HUDSON INST., 
AMERICA’S TOTAL ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD: RETHINKING 
THE USES AND NATURE OF FOREIGN AID (2005), available at http://www.hudson.org/ 
files/publications/Rethinking_Foreign_Aid.pdf; see also U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., 
FOREIGN AID IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: PROMOTING FREEDOM, SECURITY, AND 
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What both sides of the debate have missed, this Comment proposes, is not 
the role of the private sector in generating foreign aid but the role of tax 
expenditures in subsidizing it. Tax expenditures are deviations from the 
normal tax structure “designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class 
of persons.”4 They take the form of deductions, exemptions, exclusions, 
deferrals, credits, or preferential rates. Economically, these “expenditures” may 
be seen as equivalent to direct government outlays: if U.S. taxpayers saved $70 
billion last year from, say, the mortgage interest deduction, the government 
therefore gave a $70 billion (implicit) subsidy to homeownership. Stanley 
Surrey pioneered the theory of tax expenditures in the late 1960s, and the 
concept is now widely credited. Since 1974, Congress has required the annual 
publication of a tax expenditure budget.5 
Although not immediately evident from the budget data, in recent years a 
growing amount of expenditure has gone toward foreign aid. The reason lies in 
America’s tax treatment of nonprofit organizations. Whenever U.S. charities 
and foundations spend money overseas—as they have increasingly been 
doing—some portion of this spending can be attributed to the support they 
receive from numerous state and federal tax privileges. Unlike traditional ODA, 
these tax expenditure funds are privately organized and distributed, yet unlike 
voluntary transfers they are paid for by the public fisc. This is not private aid; it 
is privatized aid. 
The basic, descriptive goal of this Comment is to show, in Parts I and II, 
how nonprofit tax policies have shaped the content of American aid. The 
broader goal is to begin to connect this insight, in Part III, with the literatures 
on tax expenditures and international development—and, in so doing, to 
illuminate some attractive and unattractive features of using tax expenditures 
in the foreign aid context. 
i. hidden sources of aid 
No other tax system is as generous to its nonprofit organizations as that of 
the United States;6 U.S. nonprofit law is, in large measure, a coordinated 
 
OPPORTUNITY ch. 6, at 129 (2002) (echoing Adelman’s arguments that ODA fails to capture 
“the full measure of foreign aid”). 
4.  STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985). 
5.  Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 601(a), 
88 Stat. 297, 323 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (2000)). 
6.  See John Simon et al., The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267, 267 (Walter W. Powell & Richard 
Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
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regime of tax privileges. Many nonprofits are exempt from income, property, 
sales, and franchise taxes at all levels of government. Contributions to charities 
may be deductible under state and federal income, gift, and estate taxes. 
Section 501(c)(3) nonprofits are allowed to issue tax-exempt bonds.7 
Not everyone agrees that these tax privileges constitute tax expenditures. 
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), for example, include the charitable contributions deduction 
but not the income tax exemption in their annual tax expenditure 
compilations.8 Because of the special nature of charitable giving and nonprofit 
enterprise, one might view the forgone revenue from these provisions as a 
necessary concession to measurement difficulties, donor equity, or the 
conceptual integrity of the tax base. Among tax scholars, however, the 
mainstream position is to view both the deduction and the exemptions as tax 
expenditures—as government subsidies justifiable, if at all, on consequentialist 
grounds.9 The Supreme Court seems to concur.10 
If one acknowledges the nonprofit tax preferences (or some subset thereof) 
to be tax expenditures, it follows that the government acts as an indirect fiscal 
sponsor of the beneficiary organizations, in all that they do. When the 
organizations expend funds on grants, technical support, or submarket-rate 
loans in foreign countries “with the promotion of economic development and 
welfare as the main objective,”11 it is hard to see why, analytically, the tax 
expenditure portion of these funds—the portion effectively paid for by the 
government—should not count as official aid. 
 
7.  Nonprofit organizations also receive many lesser tax privileges. For a thorough discussion of 
their tax treatment, see JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS pts. 3-4 (3d ed. 2006); and Bazil Facchina et al., 
Privileges and Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 85 (1993). 
8.  See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 7-8 (Comm. Print 2006); OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 287-90 tbl.19-1 (2006). 
9.  See Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. 
REV. 687, 691 n.5 (1999). 
10.  See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“When the Government 
grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the 
exemption or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect 
and vicarious ‘donors.’”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
544 (1983) (“Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is 
administered through the tax system.”). 
11.  MANNING, supra note 1, at 260. This is the OECD’s definition of “official aid,” which must 
be “undertaken by the official sector.” Id. “Official development assistance” must satisfy the 
further criterion that it goes to developing countries. Id. 
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With the charitable deduction, the foreign aid subsidy occurs anytime 
individuals or corporations make contributions to a U.S.-based nonprofit that 
runs or supports appropriate programs outside the country. Federal income tax 
deductions are not available for gifts made directly to foreign recipients, but 
the rules allow full deductibility for gifts made through an American 
intermediary.12 With the various entity-level exemptions, the foreign aid 
subsidy can occur whenever a U.S.-based organization sends abroad money it 
would have otherwise lost to taxes. Other tax expenditures (arguably) made by 
the U.S. government, such as tax sparing provisions in treaties with developing 
countries, might also be classified as “hidden” foreign aid. I focus only on the 
nonprofit sector expenditures because measures aimed at incentivizing foreign 
investment have a weaker conceptual claim to being aid and a weaker empirical 
claim, I suspect, to having fostered global development.13 
As the U.S. nonprofit sector has grown larger and more international, it 
stands to reason that tax expenditures on foreign aid have swelled 
correspondingly. Of the 2078 public charities classified by the IRS in 1998 as 
“international and foreign affairs” entities, 88% were founded in 1970 or later 
and 62% were founded in 1985 or later.14 Internationally focused charities and 
foundations currently make up about 2% of the nonprofit sector, in numerical 
and revenue terms, and this figure is expected to rise.15 Many of the 
domestically focused organizations, moreover, have expanding overseas roles.16 
These trends reflect a distinctive feature of tax expenditures as compared to 
direct expenditures: once the triggering tax preference is established, the 
expenditure becomes a function of exogenous factors and can grow or shrink 
dramatically without any government action. Indeed, the recent growth in 
 
12.  I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A) (2000). Under the gift and estate taxes, these geographic restrictions 
do not apply. Id. §§ 2055, 2522 (amended 2006). 
13.  See Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, 71 
BROOK. L. REV. 639, 692-95 (2005) (discussing the theory and evidence that tax sparing is 
not effective at promoting investment in less developed countries). 
14.  MURRAY S. WEITZMAN ET AL., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK REFERENCE 133 
tbl.5.4 (2002). 
15.  JANELLE A. KERLIN & SUPAPORN THANASOMBAT, URBAN INST., THE INTERNATIONAL 
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT SUBSECTOR: SCOPE, SIZE, AND REVENUE 1, 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311360_nonprofit_subsector.pdf. 
16.  See David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 568-70 (2006) 
(describing the growing international role of U.S. charities, foundations, and donors and 
providing further statistics). 
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America’s tax expenditure aid cuts in the opposite direction of its post-Marshall 
Plan secular decline in official aid.17 
ii. estimating the expense 
So how much does the United States “spend” in tax expenditures on 
foreign aid? There are numerous, perhaps insuperable, obstacles to divining a 
reliable figure. First, there is the aforementioned debate about which nonprofit 
tax preferences (if any) should count as tax expenditures. Second, many states 
do not produce tax expenditure estimates, and when they do, their 
methodologies often differ.18 Third, many nonprofits benefit indirectly from a 
wide range of tax expenditures beyond the charitable deduction, debt-
financing exclusion, and standard exemptions; colleges and universities, for 
instance, likely capture the value of tuition credits.19  
Fourth, as the OMB ritually points out in its Analytical Perspectives reports, 
the overall revenue impact of tax expenditures cannot be determined through 
simple addition.20 Because tax expenditure policies generate behavioral 
incentives and complex interdependencies, changes to one policy may have 
first- and second-order consequences for other tax expenditures and for the 
public fisc more generally. Were the charitable deduction to be eliminated, to 
take just one example, the resultant decline in private contributions would 
make the exclusion of interest income more valuable if organizations 
responded by issuing more bonds, and it would put pressure on the 
government to compensate for the shortfall.21 
Finally, not all of U.S. nonprofits’ cross-border activity can reasonably 
claim to be foreign aid. Some organizations support religious or cultural 
causes, or causes in other wealthy countries, that would not satisfy most 
 
17.  See CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN AID: AN 
INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 15 figs.7 & 8 (2004) (charting the 
decline in official aid in real dollars and as a percentage of GDP). 
18.  See Christopher Howard, Tax Expenditures, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO 
THE NEW GOVERNANCE 410, 420 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002). 
19.  See Brody, supra note 9, at 695. Many nonprofits, of course, also benefit substantially from 
direct government expenditures and nontax legal policies. 
20.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 8, at 286. This has not stopped many tax 
experts from adding and subtracting them. See Howard, supra note 18, at 418. 
21.  The standard deduction also raises measurement problems. At present, only itemizing 
taxpayers can claim the charitable deduction. If the standard deduction were set at a lower 
rate, though, more taxpayers who donate would choose to itemize, which implies that some 
portion of the standard deduction acts as a tax expenditure in support of these marginal 
taxpayers’ gifts. See Brody, supra note 9, at 695 n.18. 
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people’s understanding of “aid.” Separating out the tax expenditure allocated 
to these activities from the expenditure allocated to true foreign aid activities 
would require difficult definitional choices, extensive recordkeeping, and fine-
grained quantitative analysis. 
Bracketing all of these caveats, casual empiricism can give us a rough sense 
of the expenditure’s magnitude. The most significant foreign aid tax 
expenditure is occasioned by the charitable deduction. The OMB estimates that 
the total revenue loss attributable to the federal income tax deduction will 
exceed $240 billion over the next five years, or roughly $48 billion per year.22 
The annual revenue loss from the federal gift and estate tax deductions, 
according to the OMB, had been running at roughly $5 billion before recent 
reforms.23 Not counting any of the state deductions, these figures suggest a 
total tax expenditure of $53 billion per year on the charitable deduction. If we 
estimate, conservatively, that 2% of U.S. donations head overseas—and make 
no adjustment for the possibility that higher-bracket taxpayers are more likely 
to support international causes—it would mean that around $1.06 billion of 
these funds is currently allocated to cross-border charity. Raise the estimate to 
a more realistic 4%,24 and the figure would be $2.12 billion. Apart from 
whatever incentive effects they might have, federal deduction expenditures 
would thus account for one-fifth of U.S. nonprofits’ total giving to lower- and 
middle-income countries,25 in an amount equal to 13% of America’s ODA 
($16.3 billion) in 2003.26 Given that up to 60% of U.S. nonprofits’ cross-border 
spending has been going to developing countries,27 approximately $1.27 billion 
 
22.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 8, at 296 tbl.19-3.  
23.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 93 tbl.5-6 (2001). This figure is shakier than the income 
tax deduction figure both because it does not incorporate post-2001 policy changes and 
because transfer tax deductions have a somewhat weaker case for being tax expenditures. 
24.  See Pozen, supra note 16, at 569-70 (reporting recent findings that 2.2% of Americans’ giving 
goes to international affairs charities and suggesting that roughly 2% more heads overseas 
through other types of nonprofits). 
25.  See David Roodman & Scott Standley, Tax Policies To Promote Private Charitable Giving in 
DAC Countries 6 tbl.1 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 82, 2006), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/6303_file_WP_82.pdf (reporting OECD Development Assistance 
Committee statistics that U.S. nongovernmental organizations gave $6.3 billion to 
developing countries and $4.3 billion to middle-income countries in 2003). 
26.  MANNING, supra note 1, at 172 tbl.8. This $16.3 billion figure is up from $10.6 billion in 
2000. Id. 
27.  See supra note 25. 
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of that $2.12 billion could be a candidate for “development assistance” 
classification.28 
The other major tax expenditures are tougher to quantify and flow mainly 
to hospitals and universities, two types of nonprofits unlikely to dispense much 
foreign charity (though some hospitals run international programs, and certain 
university policies, such as scholarships for international students and drug 
development for global diseases, might be so characterized).29 For the 
exclusion of interest income, the JCT and the OMB do not keep statistics 
beyond those for hospitals and educational facilities.30 Enterprising tax scholars 
recently estimated the annual state and federal aggregate expenditure on the 
income tax exemption and the property tax exemption at $10.1 billion and $8 
to $13 billion, respectively.31 If even 1% of the lower bound of this sum ($18.1 
billion) had gone toward international development, it would represent an 
additional $181 million in aid spending. The real figure could easily be double 
this.  
The calculations just proffered are crude, and much more work must be 
done to derive satisfactory estimates of, first, the total tax expenditure allocated 
to the nonprofit sector and, second, the portion thereof allocated to foreign 
causes deserving of the “aid” label. But the cocktail-napkin math suggests that 
annual tax expenditures on foreign aid, as delivered through private 
nonprofits, are currently running somewhere in the range of $1 to $2.5 billion, 
of which as much as $1.5 billion might reasonably be deemed ODA. 
iii. next steps 
If one accepts the argument above, then government spending on foreign 
aid is somewhat larger, and substantially different in character, than most 
commentators seem to have realized.32 What to make of this insight is a 
 
28.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text (explaining the OECD’s definition of ODA). 
29.  The charitable deduction expenditure is not skewed in this way. If contributions to 
education and health were excluded, the OMB’s projection of the annual revenue loss on the 
federal income tax deduction, see supra note 22 and accompanying text, would come to 
approximately $40 billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 8, at 296 tbl.19-3. 
30.  See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 8, at 30-42 tbl.1; OFFICE OF MGMT. 
& BUDGET, supra note 8, at 287-90 tbl.19-1.  
31.  See Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-Edged 
Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 141, 149, 150 & 
tbl.4.5 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
32.  I have been unable to find any prior discussion of these tax expenditures’ relationship to 
foreign aid. The closest I have seen appears in Roodman & Standley, supra note 25, in which 
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question large enough for a book, so here I will just try to sketch a few 
implications. 
A. Making It Count 
Perhaps the most obvious takeaway from the prior analysis is that the 
OECD and the U.S. government should start to classify tax expenditures on 
foreign aid as foreign aid, collect data thereon, and adjust their statistics 
accordingly. Estimating these tax expenditures will not be easy, as explained in 
Part II, and comparing them across countries will only increase the difficulties. 
Yet tax expenditure scholars have been developing templates for comparative 
analysis since at least 1985,33 and the OECD has the competence and credibility 
to formulate a reasonably reliable, if not entirely valid, methodology. As long as 
the OECD methodology is transparent, it should greatly advance public 
understanding of this form of aid. 
Classifying anything other than direct government spending as aid might 
be seen to start us down a slippery definitional slope: if tax expenditures on 
foreign charity should be added to the official figures, should tax expenditures 
(and U.S. subsidies more broadly) on agriculture—expenditures known to 
have devastating effects on developing-world farmers—be subtracted from the 
figures?34 Although I believe that agricultural subsidies profoundly undermine 
the United States’ good works in international development, I would resist 
such a move, so as to preserve conceptual clarity. Development-degrading tax 
expenditures can be tallied on a separate list, as can purely private 
contributions, and scrutinized just as intensively. 
 
the authors identify the charitable deduction as a “de facto aid policy,” id. at 35, and 
thoughtfully explore its incentive effects on private cross-border giving. David Roodman 
and Scott Standley do not, however, identify this “aid” as a tax expenditure, try to quantify 
its revenue cost, address possible implications of conceptualizing the deduction as aid, or 
consider the other nonprofit tax privileges. 
33.  See INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TAX EXPENDITURES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Paul R. 
McDaniel & Stanley S. Surrey eds., 1985). Another useful template is offered by the Center 
for Global Development’s remarkable Commitment to Development Index. The Index’s aid 
component—on which the United States ranked third to last in 2006—includes both 
controls for aid quality and measures of private giving attributable to tax incentives. See Ctr. 
for Global Dev., Commitment to Development Index 2006: Aid (2006), 
http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/_components/aid/. 
34.  Pushing this idea a little further, would counting foreign charity tax expenditures as ODA 
strengthen the case for counting agricultural tax expenditures as illegal farm subsidies under 
World Trade Organization rules? The U.S. government would presumably be even more 
averse to drawing this inference. I am grateful to John Colombo for suggesting this point. 
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One could also raise a pragmatic argument for excluding tax expenditures 
from the official aid figures. For those who want the U.S. government to give 
much more, there is a risk that any upward revaluation of its largesse will make 
Americans feel more confident in their generosity and thus lead to 
complacency. (In stark contrast to the United States, Sweden, the darling of 
the international development community, provides zero tax subsidies for 
foreign charity.35) Militating against this argument, however, are both the 
demands of intellectual honesty and the equally plausible prospect that, by 
stimulating increased attention to foreign aid, a public conversation on tax 
expenditures will help Americans see just how ungenerous their policies really 
are.36 Adding $1.5 billion to annual ODA would still leave the United States far 
below its peers in proportional terms. Specifically, it would have increased 
2006 spending from 0.19% to 0.20% of GNI—less than half the European 
Union’s unadjusted average and possibly insufficient to move the United 
States out of last place in the OECD rankings.37 In a foreign aid debate so 
focused on perceptions of generosity, it is damaging that the U.S. government 
does not receive full credit for its spending. But full credit would not mean 
high marks. 
B. Conceptualizing the Costs and Benefits 
Beyond simply acknowledging and keeping track of tax expenditures on 
foreign aid, how might we begin to evaluate them as tools of legal and public 
policy? One useful framework is offered by tax expenditure theory. From its 
inception, this literature has had a clear prescriptive aim: to convert most tax 
expenditures into direct expenditures or repeal them altogether.38 Following 
Surrey, critics have flagged a host of concerns. Tax expenditures increase tax 
complexity and compliance burdens (administrative concerns); they are more 
opaque and esoteric than direct expenditures and so relatively more immunized 
from public debate or scrutiny (visibility concerns); they are more likely than 
direct expenditures to have regressive first-order effects (equity concerns); 
their uses may evolve in unexpected ways (predictability concerns); and they 
 
35.  Roodman & Standley, supra note 25, at 15. 
36.  Note in this regard that recent studies have found Americans, on average, to believe that 
foreign aid accounts for 20% of the federal budget, around thirty times the actual figure. 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Development Challenge, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 78, 80. 
37.  See MANNING, supra note 1, at 16 tbl.1.1. 
38.  See Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 
187 (2004). 
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may stimulate unproductive activity or reward behavior that would have 
occurred anyway (efficiency concerns).39 
At first glance, tax expenditures on foreign aid appear to exaggerate each of 
these defects. Most obviously, their transnational character raises special 
problems of oversight and transparency. Given that wealthier Americans have 
consistently polled as being more committed to internationalism, the nonprofit 
tax privileges may also be more regressive when cross-border giving is 
concerned.40 With foreign aid, there is an especially acute tension between the 
value of fostering “pluralism, volunteerism, and compassion”41 through 
preferential treatment of the nonprofit sector, and the potential to save money 
and pursue a unitary policy vision through centralized planning and 
administration. Tax expenditures are much less likely than direct expenditures, 
one assumes, to be allocated to foreign governments or public international 
institutions such as the World Bank—bodies that are uniquely equipped to 
implement large-scale projects and reforms. Whereas traditional ODA will 
inevitably reflect the government’s political and strategic goals,42 a 
decentralized patchwork of tax expenditures may serve very different 
objectives—missionary agendas, for instance—and even contrary objectives.43 
These features of tax expenditures on foreign aid raise problems not only of 
administration, visibility, vertical equity, targeting, and efficacy, but also, one 
could argue, of democratic legitimacy. They conjure up the old notion, dating 
back to the World War II era, of the nonprofit sector as a locus of liberal 
internationalism, disconnected from, if not downright opposed to, the U.S. 
national interest.44 
Yet at the same time, tax expenditures on foreign aid possess some 
distinctive virtues not captured by standard tax expenditure analysis. These 
expenditures help develop both the U.S. nonprofit sector and global civil 
society. They diversify aid spending and increase the total amount of aid. 
(There is little reason to think that they crowd out explicit government giving 
when their uses are so unpredictable and no relevant officials appear to have 
 
39.  See, e.g., SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 4, chs. 3-4. 
40.  See Pozen, supra note 16, at 573. 
41.  U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., supra note 3, at 141 (discussing the advantages of private 
organizations in financing foreign charity). 
42.  For empirical verification of this point, see Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives 
Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33 (2000). 
43.  See Pozen, supra note 16, at 597-99 (describing and defending deductibility for gifts to 
organizations that violate executive branch policies such as the “global gag rule”). 
44.  See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 3, 19 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). 
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noted them.) They serve an educative function by connecting more Americans, 
via the beneficiary nonprofits, to issues and events around the world. They 
empower certain minority views in foreign policymaking and invigorate the 
“market” in development strategies. They cordon off one segment of the aid 
budget from the vicissitudes of constituent politics and thereby help correct for 
possible governmental failures, such as a tendency to underserve populations 
or causes that lack a domestic lobby and to underweight long-term threats. 
Although the public bodies typically bypassed by tax expenditure aid may have 
greater scope and authority to foster development, nongovernmental recipients 
may nevertheless be more effective because of their relative freedom from 
political and bureaucratic constraints and, often, corruption. 
The list could go on and on. Developing a normative appraisal of these tax 
expenditures is by no means straightforward; there is clear merit to having 
both centralized aid and decentralized aid, and striking the optimal balance 
between them will never be an exact science. Yet given America’s comparatively 
paltry levels of ODA and the well-known limitations—intuitionistic, 
psychological, biological, practical—on individuals’ capacity to show moral 
regard for distant strangers,45 I submit that tax expenditures serve a valuable 
function in institutionalizing and expanding our commitment to foreign 
charity.46 Sweden no doubt has a more targeted, consistent, and efficient aid 
 
45.  See Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1670-75 
(2003) (summarizing the philosophical literature on “plausibility constraints” that make 
cosmopolitan moral duties too demanding for individuals and more appropriately assigned 
to institutions). 
46.  To see just how subtle America’s tax expenditures on foreign aid are, an interesting 
comparison might be drawn with the globally redistributive taxes that cosmopolitan 
political theorists have recently been advocating. Many of these theorists have endorsed 
Thomas Pogge’s proposal for a “global resources tax,” a 1% consumption tax on all natural 
resources the proceeds of which would be “used toward the emancipation of the present and 
future global poor.” Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
195, 201 (1994); see also THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS ch. 8 (2002) (expanding on this idea, now 
dubbed a “Global Resources Dividend”). In the same vein, numerous academics and 
development organizations have endorsed some version of a redistributive “Tobin tax,” an 
excise tax on cross-border currency transactions the proceeds of which would likewise be 
devoted to the world’s poor. See Ctr. for Envtl. Econ. Dev., Tobin Tax Initiative, 
http://www.ceedweb.org/iirp/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2006). Global taxes such as these would 
in many senses be the inverse of our tax expenditures on foreign aid: they would be highly 
visible, administered by a central international body, purposefully and unabashedly 
redistributive, subject to ceaseless intergovernmental politicking, and coordinated to the last 
decimal point with other countries. Both functionally and symbolically, tax expenditures 
have much less capacity than global taxes to effectuate development ideals. Politically and 
programmatically, however, tax expenditures are nowhere near as demanding or as 
disruptive of the existing economic order. 
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program, but in a society as large and heterogeneous (and skeptical of big 
government) as the United States, a more pluralistic, mixed-funding approach 
may be appropriate. And regardless, transitioning to a unified aid budget 
would be extremely costly. There is no way to decouple the tax expenditures on 
nonprofits’ foreign activities from the tax expenditures on their domestic 
activities without upending the current system of tax preferences and severely 
compromising the autonomy of the nonprofit sector. 
C. Keeping Perspective 
Readers unconvinced by this cursory defense of tax expenditures on foreign 
aid need not be too alarmed. If these expenditures are politically safe from 
radical retrenchment, they are constrained from radical expansion for a more 
basic, structural reason: they are not scalable like regular expenditures. 
Although further internationalization of the nonprofit sector should keep 
driving up the subsidies, by design they will never be more than fractional 
supplements to private charity. Nonprofit organizations cannot realistically 
benefit any more from exemptions because they already pay nothing, in most 
jurisdictions, in mission-related income, property, sales, or franchise taxes. The 
charitable deduction might be extended to nonitemizers and to direct cross-
border gifts,47 but if individual and corporate donors were to receive 
significantly more generous tax breaks—on top of what are already the most 
generous such policies in the world—it could undermine the deduction’s 
popular support, if not the tax base itself. And it would be a political 
nonstarter, not to mention a communitarian nightmare, to provide stronger 
incentives for foreign giving than for domestic giving. 
For those who seek a Jeffrey Sachs-style foreign aid revolution in which the 
United States delivers on its Monterrey Consensus pledge,48 it would therefore 
be a mistake to see tax expenditures as a possible panacea. Tax expenditures are 
destined to be a limited, though important, vehicle for addressing the world’s 
most urgent problems. 
DAVID E. POZEN 
 
47.  See Pozen, supra note 16, at 595-96 (recommending possible reforms to facilitate 
international deductibility). 
48.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
